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On June 21, 2004, the United States Supreme Court decided 
the health law “case of the year” in the two consolidated cases of 
Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila and CIGNA HealthCare of Texas, Inc. v. 
Calad.1  The Court held that section 502(a) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 19742 (ERISA) “completely pre-
empt[s]” and thus invalidates the tort liability provisions of the 
Texas Health Care Liability Act3 (THCLA).4  The case could 
potentially affect the rights of millions of Americans in a matter of 
vital concern—whether they will receive the health insurance 
coverage promised them if they become unable to pay for medical 
bills out of their own resources.  The Court justified its decision as 
effecting “clear congressional intent.”5 
In reality, congressional intent was anything but clear.6  The 
Court’s decision was inconsistent with long-established and logically 
valid interpretations of procedural statutes, as well as the wording, 
structure, and underlying policies of ERISA.7  The decision was also 
inconsistent with constitutional principles that should inform all 
jurisprudence.  Instead, it was based on Supreme Court precedent 
that the Court itself had already partially disavowed as “not [giving] 
 
 1. 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) [hereinafter Davila/Calad]. 
 2. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).  ERISA is codified as Chapter 18 of the 
United States Labor Code, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461 (2000). 
 3. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-.003 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 
2004). 
 4. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2502. 
 5. At nine distinct places in the opinion, the Davila/Calad Court explicitly 
said that it was reading congressional intent.  See id. at 2491, 2495, 2498 n.4, 2499-
500, 2503.  Five times the Court said that the intent was “clear” or that evidence of 
intent was “strong.”  See id. at 2491, 2495, 2497, 2498 n.4, 2500. 
 6. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
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much help [in] drawing the line.”8 
This article does not suggest that the Davila/Calad holding was 
unexpected or completely incongruent with earlier Supreme Court 
decisions.  To the contrary, if the Court had decided the case 
differently, it would have had to break with its own precedent.  This 
article argues that the Court should have done just that—that the 
correct decision would have favored more fundamental 
considerations than the mere desire to remain superficially 
consistent with its previous holdings and rationales. 
The Court missed an opportunity to correct what has been 
called “an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.”9  This 
case had huge national importance, and the issue deserved better 
and more careful analysis than it was given by the Court. 
 




The purpose of ERISA is to broaden and strengthen the social 
safety net by encouraging employers, primarily through federal 
income tax preferences, to provide certain non-salary benefits to 
employees.10  These benefits are intended to protect employees and 
their families from impoverishment as a result of retirement, 
illness, disability, or death.  ERISA also requires those who provide 
and administer the benefits to satisfy basic standards of equity 
disclosure, integrity, and financial soundness.11 
Because the principal incentive to employers for the provision 
of non-salary benefits is the reduction of income taxes, ERISA is 
intimately correlated with the Internal Revenue Code.12  The 
Departments of Labor and Treasury are instructed to coordinate 
 
 8. N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins., 514 
U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (discussing prior attempts to construe preemption by 
ERISA). 
 9. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting 
DeFelice v. Aetna United States Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(Becker, J. concurring)). 
 10. See Parker v. BankAmerica Corp., 50 F.3d 757, 765 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(warding off economic hardship relating to joblessness and rewarding employees 
for past service to companies); Altemose Constr. Co. v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 443 F. Supp. 492, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (protecting the employees’ right to 
receive benefits). 
 11. See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). 
 12. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-20 (2000). 
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their implementing rules and regulations.13  Some employee 
benefit arrangements qualify for favorable treatment as a result of 
Congress’ desire to contribute to the social safety net.  Other 
arrangements are deemed less preferable and do not qualify for 
favorable tax treatment. 
The term “plan” is a key concept in ERISA.  A “plan” is “any 
plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an 
employer or by an employee organization [e.g., a union],” which 
has the purpose of providing certain types of non-salary benefits for 
employees.14  ERISA covers two types of plans: “pension plans” (also 
called “employee pension benefit plans”) and “welfare plans” (also 
called “employee welfare benefit plans”).  Pension plans provide 
retirement or post-employment income to employees.  As the very 
name Employee Retirement Income Security Act suggests, the 
primary focus is on pension plans.  ERISA imposes a variety of 
substantive requirements of the statute upon pension plans relating 
to participation, funding, and vesting.15  By contrast, ERISA “does 
not regulate the substantive content of welfare plans.”16 
One type of welfare plan is a plan that provides “through the 
purchase of insurance . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or 
benefits.”17  These medical plans are the principal subject of this 
article. 
B. Managed Care and Health Maintenance Organizations 
For many years, national health care costs have risen 
substantially faster than the rate of inflation.18  Although the causes 
are numerous, one factor undoubtedly has been the third-party 
payment system.  The vast majority of health care costs are not paid 
by the patients.19  Instead, the costs are typically paid by a third-
party directly, such as a governmental entity or a health insurance 
 
 13. ERISA § 3004, 29 U.S.C. § 1204. 
 14. ERISA § 3(1)-(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(3). 
 15. ERISA §§ 201-308, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-86. 
 16. See Metro. Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985). 
 17. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). 
 18. See Consumer Price Index: September 2004, NEWS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR NEWS 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington D.C.) (Oct. 19, 2004), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cpi_10192004.pdf; see also JANET LUNDY 
ET AL., TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE, 2004 
Update exhibit 1.3 (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2004), available at 
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031/index.cfm. 
 19. See LUNDY, supra note 18, at exhibit 1.8. 
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company.  Thus, a patient receives the full benefits of the care but 
pays only a portion of its cost.  Arguably, this disassociation between 
costs and benefits can lead to over utilization of medical services 
and a misallocation of economic resources.20 
Care providers themselves could limit the provision of health 
care services, but they too may operate under distorted incentives.  
For example, a physician may be faced with a choice of two 
medications to prescribe to a patient.  One medication might be 
slightly more efficacious but considerably more expensive than the 
other.  If the physician knows that the patient will be paying for the 
medication out of his own pocket, he may give the patient a 
detailed comparison of the two alternatives.  On the other hand, if 
the physician knows that a third-party will bear the entire cost, he 
will have little reason to discuss the less expensive possibility. 
In a variation of this situation, the patient and the physician 
might be faced with a choice of medical treatments, and the 
treatment decision could affect the physician’s own interests.  For 
example, an issue might arise as to whether the patient should 
spend one or two days in the hospital following surgery.  It might 
be slightly preferable, medically, for the patient to spend two days 
in the hospital, but the financial cost of the additional day could be 
significant.  If fully informed of the consequences, the patient, if 
paying for the care himself, might reasonably elect to spend only 
one day in the hospital after the surgery.  However, if the patient 
spends an extra day in the hospital, the physician will be paid for 
that additional day of care.  Ethically, the physician is bound to 
advise the patient solely according to the patient’s welfare.21  
Nevertheless, physicians have human frailties and may consciously 
or unconsciously steer the patient toward the alternative that best 
suits the doctor’s personal interests.  Such propensities may be 
accentuated if the doctor understands that a third party, rather 
than the patient, will pay for the hospitalization.  
 
 20. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Was Withdrawing Vioxx the ‘Right Thing to Do’?, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2004, at A17 (deciding whether to take one drug or medical 
treatment over another may depend on whether a third party is paying). 
 21. See AM. MED. ASS’N, PRINCIPLES OF MED. ETHICS No. VIII, available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html (last visited Mar. 1, 
2005) (defining standards of conduct for honorable physician behavior including 
“responsibility to the patient as paramount”); AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MED. 
ETHICS E-8.054, E-10.015, available at http://www/ama-
assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11760.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) 
(regarding ethical conduct within the patient-physician relationship as to financial 
incentives). 
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As a remedy, the concept of managed care was developed in 
the early 1970s.  The American Medical Association (AMA) has 
defined “managed care” as “those processes or techniques used by 
any entity that delivers, administers, and/or assumes risks for 
health care services in order to control or influence the quality, 
accessibility, utilization, or costs and prices or outcomes of such 
services provided to a defined enrollee population.”22 
One of the ideas behind managed care is that health care 
providers and recipients should not make all decisions regarding 
the provision of health care services.  Third-party payers should also 
have a say.23  Under the managed care scenario, health care 
decisions are to be guided by objective standards of medical 
efficacy and cost.24  A managed care organization (MCO), which 
may be the payer or act on behalf of the payer, will apply these 
standards to specific situations to determine which procedures are 
medically efficacious and cost-effective.  Only procedures that meet 
the criteria of efficacy and economy qualify for payment.  
Furthermore, health care providers may be given economic 
incentives to reduce cost in their treatment decisions.25 
Part of the savings from managed care comes from the 
management of health care services, with a focus on costs as well as 
medical efficacy.  Another aspect of the savings—in many instances 
more pronounced than savings from the actual care 
management—comes from the economic influence MCOs can 
exert over health care providers.  MCOs contract with physicians, 
hospitals, and other providers, under which those providers agree 
to provide health care services to the beneficiaries of the MCOs at 
 
 22. AM. MED. ASS’N, HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES H-285.998, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/noindex/category/ 11760.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). 
 23. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Managed Care, at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/managed.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). 
 24. AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON MEDICAL SERVICES REPORT 5 (Dec. 2001), at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/7008.html; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, 
HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES H-
285.920, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/ 
11760.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (setting forth criteria, acceptable to the 
medical profession, for the development and use of level of care guidelines).  
There is intense debate between the managed care industry and the medical 
profession as to whether the guidelines meet these standards. 
 25. See National Conference of State Legislatures, What Legislators Need to 
Know About Managed Care: Executive Summary, at 
http://www.ncsl.org/public/catalog /6642ex.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) 
[hereinafter Executive Summary]. 
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rates substantially reduced from those charged to nonbeneficiaries.  
In exchange, the MCOs provide economic inducements to 
beneficiaries to utilize the providers’ services.26  The contracts 
between the MCOs and the care providers are sometimes called 
“provider panel contracts.”  The providers are deemed to belong to 
the managed care organization’s “provider panel.”  Such 
arrangements are feasible only if large numbers of potential 
patients subscribe to the managed care organization’s health care 
plan. 
Managed care has several drawbacks.  First, the process 
interposes a potentially disruptive third party, the MCO, into what 
should ideally be a private and intimate relationship between 
patient and physician.27  Another drawback is that the bureaucratic 
procedures and personnel imposed by managed care are sources of 
significant inefficiency.  A third drawback arises in situations where 
optimal medical care is substantially more expensive than 
suboptimal care.  MCOs have their own, frequently disparaged, 
economic incentives that may sacrifice patient welfare to cost 
considerations.  Today, more than 200 million Americans are 
covered by private or government-sponsored managed care plans.28 
A health maintenance organization (HMO) is one type of 
MCO.  The Federal Health Maintenance Act, defines an HMO as 
an entity, organized under state law, that, inter alia, provides basic 
health services for a predetermined periodic fee.29  That fee “is 
fixed without regard to the frequency, extent, or kind of service 
(within the basic health services) actually furnished.”30  HMOs are 
seen as alternatives to the more traditional fee-for-service health 
care plans where payments are made for each service rendered.  As 
with all MCOs, HMOs employ economic incentives to reduce 
 
 26. See AM. MED. ASS’N, PRINCIPLES OF MANAGED CARE 2 (5th ed. 2004), 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/363/ 
principlesmanagecare.pdf. 
 27. See AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS E-9.123; E-10.01(4), E-
10.015, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11760.html 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005). 
 28. See America's Health Insurance Plans, About AHIP, at 
http://www.ahip.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (representing nearly 1300 
companies that provide health insurance coverage).  An ERISA plan that uses an 
MCO to provide or administer benefits is sometimes called a “managed care plan.“ 
See Executive Summary, supra note 25. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e(a), (b)(1) (2000). 
 30. Id. at (b)(1). 
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overall health care expenditures.31 
In non-emergency situations, HMOs generally require 
prospective “utilization review” before providing coverage.32  HMOs 
make their utilization review decisions by interpreting the 
documents that define their coverage.33  Such documents regulate 
the scope of coverage through specific exclusions and a general 
contract term requiring that services and other benefits be 
“medically necessary.”34  Participants (also called “members” or 
“beneficiaries”) may appeal adverse coverage determinations 
through administrative procedures provided by the HMO or, in 
most states, by statutorily mandated external reviews.35  HMO 
participants are also free to obtain whatever health care they 
choose, so long as they are willing and able to pay for such care.36 
HMOs provide various mechanisms to challenge prospective 
benefit denials.  In the simplest situation, a physician may 
telephone or write to an HMO utilization reviewer to explain why 
the denial was improper.37  Although third-party health care payers 
pay physicians for the provision of medical services, neither HMOs 
nor the patients will, as a general rule, pay extra for ancillary efforts 
such as writing letters or making telephone calls to HMO 
 
 31. Executive Summary, supra note 25. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See generally AM. MED. ASS’N, MODEL MANAGED CARE CONTRACT (3d ed. 
2002), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/9559.html 
[hereinafter AMA, MODEL MANAGED CARE CONTRACT] (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). 
 34. Id. at 39-40.  The American Medical Association defines “medical 
necessity” as 
[h]ealth care services or products that a prudent physician would provide 
to a patient for the purpose of preventing, diagnosing or treating an 
illness, injury, disease or its symptoms in a manner that is: (a) in 
accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice; (b) 
clinically appropriate in terms of type, frequency, extent, site, and 
duration; and (c) not primarily for the economic benefit of the health 
plans and purchasers or for the convenience of the patient, treating 
physician, or other health care provider. 
Id.; see also AMA Policy H-320.953(3), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/ 
noindex/category/11760.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).  While some MCOs have 
moved toward the AMA definition, it is not industry standard.  Many MCOs 
emphasize cost containment as an element of the medical necessity 
determination. 
 35. AMA, MODEL MANAGED CARE CONTRACT, supra note 33, at 40. 
 36. See Executive Summary, supra note 25. 
 37. The AMA believes that physicians have an ethical duty to advocate for 
their patients with HMOs to secure necessary medical care.  AMA CODE OF 
MEDICAL ETHICS §§ E-8.13, E-8.135, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/noindex/category/ 11760.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). 
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administrators.38  Time and effort spent by a physician or his office 
staff to override an HMO coverage decision will generally go 
uncompensated.39 
Because HMOs transfer costs of ongoing medical expenditures 
from individual members to a large institution by means of a fixed 
fee, they are sometimes considered insurance companies.40  
However, they also decide what medical care is necessary in specific 
circumstances and provide care through their panel of physicians 
and other medical care givers.41  Therefore, they may also be 
deemed, themselves, providers of medical treatment.42 
Supporters claim that because HMOs have an incentive to 
minimize the medical procedures utilized, HMOs reduce waste and 
encourage preventive care.43  Detractors counter that the principal 
effect is merely to reduce the amount of care received, with little 
regard for what may be medically necessary.44  HMO incentives 
have been waggishly critiqued in the following terms: 
From a short-term financial standpoint—which we do not 
suggest is the only standpoint that an HMO is likely to 
have—the HMO’s incentive is to keep you healthy if it can 
 
 38. AMA COUNCIL ON MEDICAL SERVICE REPORT, PAYMENT FOR MANAGED CARE 
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 266 (Dec. 1997). 
 39. Even if the patient wanted to pay the physician for advocating on his 
behalf, he probably could not do so.  As noted supra, the federal HMO law 
specifies that, for basic health services the premium is a fixed sum, regardless of 
the extent of basic health services provided.  42 U.S.C. § 300e(b)(1).  Arguably, 
provider panel contracts could define physician advocacy efforts as something 
other than "basic health services" for these purposes.  In practice, they do not.  
Standard HMO contracts prohibit physicians from receiving any payments from 
patients (through what is known as “balance billing”), except under narrowly 
defined circumstances.  AMA, MODEL MANAGED CARE CONTRACT, supra note 33, § 
3.10; see also Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir. 1984) 
(upholding a “ban on balance billing” practice if doctors do not make additional 
charges). 
 40. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 366-67 (2002). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 
1406, 1409 (7th Cir. 1995); see America's Health Insurance Plans, Health Care 
Quality: Utilization of Health Services, at http://www.ahip.org/content/ 
default.aspx?bc= 41|331|360 (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). 
 44. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 65 F.3d at 1409.  HMO travails are a 
popular Hollywood staple.  For example, the movies JOHN Q (New Line 
Productions, Inc. 2002) (starring Denzel Washington), AS GOOD AS IT GETS 
(Columbia/TriStar Studios 1997) (starring Helen Hunt), and THE RAINMAKER 
(Paramont Studio 1997) (starring Matt Damon) all addressed heroic efforts by 
ordinary citizens to secure payment from the evil HMO for their critically ill 
children. 
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but if you get very sick, and are unlikely to recover to a 
healthy state involving few medical expenses, to let you 
die as quickly and cheaply as possible.  HMOs compensate 
for these perceived drawbacks by charging a lower price 
than fee-for-service plans.45 
C. The Patients’ Bill of Rights and the Texas Health Care Liability Act 
As observed in Part I.A, ERISA does not substantively regulate 
welfare plans.  Yet the very nature of the HMO calls for government 
regulation.  Insurance policies are written in legally dense terms, 
prepared solely by HMO attorneys.  Huge disparities in size and 
sophistication separate an HMO and its individual members.  At 
the very moment when plan beneficiaries are most in need of the 
protection promised by their health insurance companies, they may 
be least able to advocate for their rights.  The fundamental issue as 
to what medical services should be covered in a specific situation is, 
at least in the details, beyond a lay person’s capacity to determine.  
The potential for deception, overreaching, or other forms of heavy-
handedness by MCOs is rife. 
In response to the regulatory vacuum, consumer advocates 
have called for a “patients’ bill of rights.”46  The concept, in 
essence, describes laws that would protect beneficiaries of MCOs 
from wrongful benefit denials by HMOs.  At the federal level, it 
refers to an amendment to ERISA that would provide tort damages 
for such denials.  Although bills to this effect have been introduced 
in both houses of Congress and have been the subject of nationally 
televised debate during the past two presidential elections,47 no 
such legislation has been passed.48 
Patients’ rights advocates have been more successful at the 
state level.  The first state patients’ bill of rights, known as Senate 
Bill 386 (S.B. 386), was passed in Texas and took effect May 22, 
1997.49  S.B. 386 included THCLA, which imposes tort liability on 
MCOs (including HMOs) that fail to exercise ordinary care when 
 
 45. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 65 F.3d at 1410. 
 46. See Sydney A. Halpern, Medical Authority & the Culture of Rights, 29 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 835, 847 (Aug. - Oct. 2004). 
 47. Commission on Presidential Debates, Debate Transcripts, available at 
http:// www.debates.org/pages/debtrans.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). 
 48. See Sylvia A. Law, Do We Still Need a Federal Patients’ Bill of Rights?, 3 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 27-31 (2002) (discussing the political battle over a 
patients’ bill of rights). 
 49. S.B. 386, 1997 Leg., 75th Sess. (Tex. 1997). 
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/3
3NELSON 3/18/2005  4:07:20 PM 
2005] A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 853 
making health care treatment decisions.50 
THCLA section 88.002 states: 
A health insurance carrier, health maintenance 
organization, or other managed care entity for a health 
care plan has the duty to exercise ordinary care when 
making health care treatment decisions and is liable for 
damages for harm to an insured or enrollee proximately 
caused by its failure to exercise such ordinary care.  [This 
creates] no obligation on the part of the . . . health 
maintenance organization . . . to provide to an insured or 
enrollee treatment which is not covered by the health care 
plan . . . .51 
THCLA section 88.001 states: 
(5) Health care treatment decision’ means a 
determination made when medical services are actually 
provided by the health care plan and a decision which 
affects the quality of the diagnosis, care, or treatment 
provided to the plan’s insureds or enrollees. 
. . . . 
(8) ‘Managed care entity’ means any entity which delivers, 
administers, or assumes risk for health care services with 
systems or techniques to control or influence the quality, 
accessibility, utilization, or costs and prices of such 
services to a defined enrollee population, but does not 
include an employer purchasing coverage . . . on behalf of 
its employees or the employees of one or more 
subsidiaries or affiliated corporations of the employer . . . . 
. . . . 
(10) ‘Ordinary care’ means, in the case of a . . . health 
maintenance organization . . . that degree of care that a . . 
. health maintenance organization . . . of ordinary 
prudence would use under the same or similar 
circumstances.52 
Almost immediately after its passage, Aetna Insurance 
Company, one of the largest insurance companies in the United 
States, sued to have S.B. 386 declared invalid as being in conflict 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002 (Vernon 1997). 
 52. Id. at § 88.001.  The THCLA definition of “managed care entity” closely 
tracks the AMA definition of “managed care.”  See supra note 22 and 
accompanying text. 
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with ERISA and with the Federal Employees Health Benefit Act.53  
For the most part, the Fifth Circuit ruled against Aetna and upheld 
S.B. 386.54  It specifically upheld the tort liability provisions, by 
holding, in essence, that those provisions regulated health care and 
so they did not impinge on the federal regulation of employee 
benefit plans.55 
Despite the favorable ruling from the Fifth Circuit, the victory for 
THCLA was incomplete.  The United States Supreme Court had not 
examined THCLA.  Until Davila/Calad, whether state laws that impose 
such tort liability on HMOs could withstand a Supreme Court challenge 
remained an open question.56 
II. THE DAVILA/CALAD CASE 




Juan Davila was a post-polio patient suffering from diabetes 
and arthritis.57  He received Aetna HMO coverage through his 
employer’s health plan.58  Aetna administered the plan by, inter 
alia, determining coverage, and it funded the plan by paying for 
benefits from its own assets.59 
As part of its benefit structure, Aetna established a formulary 
to govern the use of prescription drugs.60  Under the formulary, 
Aetna unconditionally approved certain drugs, without a pre-
certification requirement, so long as it deemed them medically 
 
 53. Corp. Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000), 
reh’g denied, 220 F.3d 641 (2000), vacated in part on other grounds, sub nom. 
Montemayor v. Corp. Health Ins., 536 U.S. 935 (2002); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
461 (ERISA); 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-13 (Federal Employees Health Benefit Act). 
 54. 215 F.3d at 526. 
 55. Id. at 534. 
 56. When Davila/Calad was decided, fourteen states had laws imposing tort 
liability against HMOs for incorrect decisions as to proper health care treatment.  
See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Managed Care Insurer Liability, at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/liable.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). 
 57. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. 
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Brief for Petitioner Aetna Health, Inc., at 6, Aetna Health, Inc. v. 
Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 02-1845) (Dec. 18, 2003), available at 2003 WL 
23010751 [hereinafter Aetna Brief]. 
 60. Id. at 8. 
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necessary.61  Other medications, however, which were more 
expensive, required a “step-therapy program.”62 
Under the formulary’s step-therapy program, the patient 
would first have to try alternative, less expensive medications 
unconditionally listed in the formulary.63  The patient would have 
to demonstrate that those less expensive medications were 
ineffective or caused intolerable side effects before Aetna would 
pay for the more expensive medication.64  However, the patient’s 
physician could explain to Aetna why the unconditionally approved 
drugs might be inappropriate for a particular patient, because of 
an allergy or other contraindication.65  If Aetna accepted that 
explanation, it would allow the patient to bypass the step-therapy 
program and move immediately to a more expensive drug.66 
Davila’s primary care physician, who served on Aetna’s 
provider panel (and was therefore paid by Aetna), prescribed 
Vioxx for Davila’s arthritic pain.67  Vioxx, an anti-inflammatory 
drug known as a Cox 2 inhibitor, was at the time commonly 
prescribed for treatment of chronic pain.  Some studies had shown 
that Cox 2 inhibitors have a lower rate of gastrointestinal toxicity 
(e.g., bleeding, ulceration, perforation of the stomach) than do 
similar but older drugs,68 including drugs known as Cox 1 
inhibitors.69  Aetna’s formulary listed fifteen other drugs for 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002), reversed sub nom. 
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004). 
 65. See Aetna Brief, supra note 59, at 9.  A physician who feels that an HMO’s 
step-therapy program should be bypassed for a specific patient will generally be 
uncompensated for the effort required to communicate this recommendation to 
the HMO.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 66. Aetna Brief, supra note 59, at 9.  Step-therapy programs and drug 
formularies are standard features of HMO plans.  They are designed to steer 
beneficiaries toward less expensive medications, which the HMO deems to be 
clinical near-equivalents of the more costly drugs.  See Associates & Wilson, 
Prescription Drug Benefit Management:  Improving Quality, Promoting Better Access, and 
Reducing Costs, America’s Health Insurance Plans, at 
http://ahip.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?docid=170&linkid=1295 (Oct. 2003). 
 67. Aetna Brief, supra note 59, at 8. 
 68. PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE 2048 (Thompson eds., 58th ed. 2004). 
 69. Prescription of Vioxx has since been generally shown to be clinically 
unwarranted, due to side effects previously not fully recognized and also due to 
the availability of efficacious alternative medications.  Its manufacturer has 
withdrawn the drug from further distribution.  Merck Halts Vioxx Sales on Health 
Threats, Associated Press Release (Sept. 30, 2004); U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Vioxx (rofecoxib) 
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treatment of chronic arthritis, which it had unconditionally 
approved.  Vioxx, being more expensive, would not be covered 
unless Davila had first tried two of the unconditionally approved 
drugs and found them unsuitable.70 
Davila’s physician did not explain to Aetna why it should 
bypass the step-therapy program, and so Aetna refused to pay for 
the Vioxx71 despite what the complaint alleged to be the physician’s 
“protests.”72  Consequently, as an alternative to the Vioxx, Davila’s 
physician prescribed Naprosyn, a Cox 1 inhibitor73 listed as 
unconditionally approved on the drug formulary.74 
After three weeks on the Naprosyn, Davila was rushed to the 
emergency room.75  Emergency room doctors reported that Davila 
was suffering from ulcers, which were bleeding internally and had 
nearly led to a heart attack.76  The hospital gave Davila seven units 
of blood and kept him in critical care for five days.77  Subsequently, 
he was unable to take any pain medication that would be absorbed 
through the stomach.78  Davila attributed his bleeding to his use of 
Naprosyn.79 
2. Calad 
Through her husband’s employer, Ruby Calad became a 
beneficiary of CIGNA HealthCare of Texas, Inc. (CIGNA), a Texas 
HMO.80  Calad underwent a hysterectomy with rectal, bladder, and 
vaginal repair.81  A physician on CIGNA’s provider panel 
performed the surgery.82 
 
Questions and Answers, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/vioxx/ 
vioxxQA.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2005). 
 70. Aetna Brief, supra note 59, at 9. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Plaintiff's Original Petition ¶ 13, Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila (on file with 
author). 
 73. PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE, supra note 68. 
 74. Vioxx and Naprosyn are known as nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 
(NSAIDs).  The most famous and widely used NSAID is common aspirin. 
 75. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. 
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 302. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Brief for Petitioner CIGNA Healthcare of Texas, Inc. at 3, Aetna 
Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 03-83) (Dec. 18, 2003), available 
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The contract between CIGNA and Calad’s husband’s employer 
provided that CIGNA would, with certain exceptions, pay its 
beneficiaries’ medically necessary health care expenses.83  Under its 
standard guidelines, CIGNA generally deems a one-day stay in the 
hospital sufficient after a hysterectomy and ordinarily refuses to pay 
hospital benefits beyond that day.84 
In this instance, Calad’s surgeon recommended a longer stay 
than one-day.85  CIGNA’s hospital discharge nurse, however, 
reviewed the file and determined that the standard one-day 
hospital stay was medically sufficient.86  Based on her 
determination, CIGNA refused to authorize payment beyond one 
day.87 
Either because she was unable or unwilling to pay for the 
additional care out of her own pocket (or perhaps did not fully 
understand the situation or appreciate the medical consequences), 
Calad had herself discharged from the hospital after the one day 
that CIGNA had authorized.88  Subsequently, however, she suffered 
complications from the surgery.  A few days later she returned to 
the emergency room for further treatment.  She attributed the 
complications to her early release from the hospital.89 
B. Lower Court Proceedings 
Davila and Calad sued separately in Texas state court,90 
alleging violations of THCLA.  Davila claimed that Aetna had failed 
to exercise ordinary care when it refused to pay for his Vioxx, and 
Calad claimed that CIGNA had failed to exercise ordinary care 
when it refused to pay for her extended hospital stay.91  The HMOs 
removed their respective cases to federal district court pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) based on federal question jurisdiction.92  Davila 
and Calad moved to remand, and the HMOs opposed their 
motions on the grounds that ERISA section 502(a) completely 
 
at 2003 WL 23010752. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 3-4. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  Davila and Calad used the same lawyer. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
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preempted THCLA.93  The district courts agreed, determining that 
the only cause of action available was under ERISA, and denied the 
motions to remand.94  Both Davila and Calad refused to amend 
their pleadings to bring explicit ERISA claims, and the district 
courts dismissed the cases with prejudice under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).95 
Davila and Calad appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which consolidated their cases and 
joined them with two other similar suits.96  While the procedural 
postures of the two other lawsuits were slightly different from the 
Davila and Calad cases,97 all of the cases raised the same ultimate 
legal issue—whether ERISA section 502(a) preempted THCLA 
claims against employer-sponsored HMOs.98 
The Roark decision observed that ERISA section 502(a) lists 
various remedies established by Congress to rectify ERISA 
violations.  The court noted that in prior cases it had deemed some 
claims related to ERISA plans to be “completely preempted.”99  If 
state causes of action “duplicate[] or fall[] within the scope of an 
ERISA section 502(a) remedy,” they are completely preempted and 
removable to federal court.100  Otherwise, they are not completely 
preempted and not removable to federal court.101  The question 
was whether the Davila/Calad lawsuits sought to duplicate or fall 
within the scope of the ERISA section 502(a) remedies. 
After examining the causes of action available under section 
502(a), the court determined that most of the section 502(a) 
 
 93. See Brief for Petitioner CIGNA Healthcare of Texas, Inc. at 3, Aetna 
Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 03-83) (Dec. 18, 2003), available 
at 2003 WL 23010752. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302-03 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub 
nom. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004). 
 96. The two other suits were also brought by the same lawyer for the 
plaintiffs.  The Fifth Circuit decision for the consolidated cases is published as 
Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002).  Roark is the plaintiff’s name 
in one of the companion lawsuits and Humana was the HMO sued in that case. 
 97. For example, in one of the companion suits the district court judge had 
granted the motion to remand, finding the THCLA claim not preempted 
 98. The other two cases ultimately settled and were not argued before the 
United States Supreme Court.  Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 
2002), cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 986 (2003). 
 99. See Roark, 307 F.3d at 309. 
 100. Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 101. Id. 
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remedies were clearly inapplicable.102  Arguably, though, the 
Davila/Calad claims might fall under either of two provisions of 
section 502(a): section 502(a)(1)(B), which provides a cause of 
action for the recovery of wrongfully denied benefits, or section 
502(a)(2), which allows suit against a plan fiduciary for breaches of 
fiduciary duty to the plan.103 
Analyzing section 502(a)(2), the court determined that the 
decisions for which the HMOs were being sued were “mixed 
eligibility and treatment decisions,” as described in Pegram v. 
Herdrich104 and, hence, were not fiduciary in nature.105  Thus, 
section 502(a)(2) was inapplicable.106  The court next found that 
Davila’s and Calad’s claims did not fall within the scope of section 
502(a)(1)(B) either.  The court noted that Section 502(a)(1)(B) 
creates a cause of action for reimbursement of wrongfully denied 
benefits—essentially, a claim for breach of contract.107  Davila and 
Calad, however, were seeking tort damages, arising from “an 
external, statutorily imposed duty of ‘ordinary care.’”108 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that because the THCLA cause of 
action was different from the causes of action listed in section 
502(a) it was not completely preempted.  Accordingly, Davila and 
Calad had brought valid suits under a state law, and there was no 
reason to dismiss those suits for failure to state a cause of action or 
to infer that a THCLA claim was one that could only be brought 
under a federal statute, ERISA.  Therefore, because the court did 
not have federal question jurisdiction, the trial courts should have 
granted the motions to remand.109  The court reversed the Davila 
and Calad cases on that basis.110 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 305-06. 
 104. 530 U.S. 211, 229 (2000). 
 105. Pegram held that a decision by a physician acting on behalf of an HMO as 
to the proper course of medical treatment for a plan beneficiary was not fiduciary 
in nature, within the meaning of ERISA section 502(a)(2).  Id.  The Court 
characterized the physician’s decision as to how the patient should be treated for 
appendicitis as one of “mixed eligibility and treatment,” because the patient’s 
eligibility for benefits from the HMO depended on that treatment decision.  Id.  
Pegram concerned liability under ERISA itself (holding that there was no such 
liability) and did not address preemption of state law.  Id. 
 106. Roark, 307 F.3d at 308. 
 107. Id. at 309. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 315. 
 110. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court decisions in the companion 
suits, which were in a different procedural posture from the Davila and Calad 
17
Nelson: Aetna v. Davila/CIGNA v. Calad: A Missed Opportunity
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
3NELSON 3/18/2005  4:07:20 PM 
860 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:3 
C. Conflict in the Courts 
Aetna and CIGNA both petitioned the Supreme Court for 
certiorari.  The Fifth Circuit had relied heavily on the Pegram 
rationale, and judicial decisions before Pegram became arguably 
irrelevant to a current understanding of the law.  Thus, one might 
have expected a passage of several years before the lower courts 
could develop an analysis of “mixed eligibility and treatment 
decisions.”  This was not so. 
The question of HMO tort liability for medical necessity 
decisions was too important to remain on the back burner.  By 
2003, when the Supreme Court addressed the writ of certiorari 
petitions, a clear split had already developed in the lower court 
decisions.  Land v. CIGNA Healthcare of Florida,111 Cicio v. Does,112 and 
Pappas v. Asbel113 all held that ERISA does not completely preempt 
state laws of negligence against HMOs who withhold payment of 
health care benefits because they have determined that proposed 
treatment is medically unnecessary—a “mixed eligibility and 
treatment decision” under Pegram.114  On the other hand, DiFelice v. 
Aetna U.S. Healthcare115 held in favor of complete ERISA preemption 
of state law.116  Unlike the Davila/Calad suit, all of those cases 
considered common law negligence, rather than a statute 
specifically tailored to the health insurance industry, such as 
THCLA.  The Court granted certiorari to CIGNA and Aetna on 
November 3, 2003.117   
 
cases.  In the Roark case itself, the panel held that ERISA did preempt THCLA, 
stating that it might have decided against preemption “[i]f we were writing on a 
clean slate.”  Id. at 313.  However, it felt procedurally bound by what it deemed a 
“factually indistinguishable” precedent, Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 
1321 (5th Cir. 1992).  Id.  The panel intimated that an en banc court might decide 
this issue differently.  Id.  However, a later request for en banc hearing was denied.  
Roark v. Humana, Inc., Nos. 01-10831, 01-10891, 01-10905, 2003 WL 21018397 (5th 
Cir. Apr. 15, 2003).  As observed supra, note 98, both companion cases then 
settled. 
 111. 339 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 112. 321 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 113. 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001). 
 114. 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
 115. 346 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 116. Id. at 449. 
 117. CIGNA HealthCare of Tex., Inc. v. Calad, cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 463 
(2003); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 462 (2003). 
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D. Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court, after first recounting the underlying facts 
of the Davila/Calad case and the Fifth Circuit decision, explained 
the general nature of the complete preemption doctrine.  Under 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a civil action filed in a state court can be 
removed to a federal court if the plaintiff could have filed in 
federal court initially and the federal court would have had proper 
subject matter jurisdiction.  One such category of suit is a “federal 
question” case: a case “arising under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.”118  The issue in Davila/Calad was 
whether those actions had arisen under the laws of the United 
States, notwithstanding that the complaints on their face purported 
to be based solely on violations of THCLA and never mentioned 
ERISA or any other federal law. 
Under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, the determination of 
federal question jurisdiction comes from the plaintiff’s statement of 
his own claim.  If the plaintiff asserts a cause of action necessarily 
based on a federal law, then the federal courts could have had 
jurisdiction over the case and the suit can be removed from state to 
federal court.  If the claim is not based on federal law, however, it is 
not removable.119  The well-pleaded complaint rule applies even if it 
is certain that the defendant will argue federal law to defend 
against the claim.  In fact, it applies even if the complaint explicitly 
anticipates, on its face, that a federal law will be raised in defense 
and it then cites to that law.120  As long as the complaint raises solely 
state law claims it is not removable.121 
An exception arises, however, if a federal statute “wholly 
displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-
emption.”122  This occurs when Congress intends that federal law is 
to regulate all aspects of a particular area of law.  In such instances, 
federal law preempts state law, and even if the claim is couched 
solely in terms of a state law claim, the claim is deemed to be based 
on federal law.123  When a claim is made in a completely preempted 
area of law it is removable to the federal courts.  ERISA, the Court 
 
 118. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
 119. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2004). 
 120. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987). 
 121. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2494. 
 122. Id. at 2494-95 (quoting Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 
(2003)). 
 123. Id. at 2495. 
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held, is one of those statutes giving rise to complete preemption.124 
The Court cited three factors to justify its conclusion that 
ERISA completely preempts state law.  First, ERISA sets out 
substantive regulatory requirements for employee benefit plans, 
which establish a “uniform regulatory regime,” including a detailed 
catalogue of remedies and sanctions for violations of the statute.125  
Thus, “[t]he policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain 
remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme 
would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and 
beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under the state law that 
Congress rejected in ERISA.”126  Second, ERISA section 514127 
includes expansive pre-emption provisions.  These ensure that 
employee benefit plan regulation is to be exclusively a federal 
concern.128  Third, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor129 had 
found the language of ERISA to be similar to the language of 
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 
(LMRA).130  Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Association 
of Machinists131 held that LMRA  section 301 converts state causes of 
action into federal ones to determine the propriety of removal132 
and therefore ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) should be given the 
same weight.133  Thus, the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism 
should be deemed a provision with “such extraordinary pre-
emptive power” that, for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint 
rule, it converts an ordinary state law complaint into a federal 
claim.134 
Next, the Court held that because ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) 
sets forth remedies for denial of coverage promised under an 
employee benefit plan, a suit complaining of a benefit denial is 
limited to ERISA remedies unless the benefit denial gives rise to a 
violation of law independent of ERISA and of the plan terms.135  In 
Davila/Calad, the only complaints were that the HMOs denied the 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.  (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 418 U.S. 41, 42 (1987)). 
 127. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000). 
 128. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2495-96. 
 129. 481 U.S. 58 (1987). 
 130. Id. at 65-66; see 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000). 
 131. 390 U.S. 557 (1968). 
 132. Id. at 560. 
 133. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2496. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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coverage promised under the terms of ERISA-regulated employee 
benefit plans.  Davila and Calad premised their cases under 
THCLA, but their THCLA claims derived from the rights and 
obligations established by the benefit plans, which were federally 
regulated contracts.136  Hence, regardless of their characterization, 
Davila’s and Calad’s claims fell within the scope of ERISA section 
502(a)(1)(B) and were completely preempted and removable to 
federal court.137 
The Court then disposed of the argument, made in the Fifth 
Circuit and in several other lower courts,138 that mixed eligibility 
and treatment decisions, as described in Pegram, should fall outside 
ERISA’s preemptive scope.  Pegram, it said, should be limited to 
situations where the person making the coverage decisions is also 
the claimant’s treating physician.139  Here, there was no such 
relationship between Davila, Calad, and their respective HMOs.  
The decisions in this case were “pure eligibility decisions,” and 
thus, Pegram was not implicated.140 
Accordingly, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment 
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its findings 
of complete pre-emption under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) and 
valid removability to the federal courts.141  While not explicitly 
stated, the clear inference was that the courts were to dismiss the 
complaints because Davila and Calad had announced that they 
would not amend their complaints to allege ERISA-based claims.142 
While the decision was unanimous, Justice Ginsburg, joined by 
Justice Breyer, filed a concurring opinion.143  She noted that the 
Court’s decisions in this area had “yielded a host of situations in 
which persons adversely affected by ERISA-proscribed wrongdoing 
cannot gain make-whole relief.”144  A “gaping wound” was caused by 
“the breadth of preemption and limited remedies under ERISA, as 
interpreted by this Court.”145  She therefore joined a “rising judicial 
chorus urging that Congress and this Court revisit what is an unjust 
 
 136. Id. at 2496-97. 
 137. Id. at 2498. 
 138. See supra Part II.C. 
 139. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2501. 
 140. Id. at 2502. 
 141. Id. 
 142. That is, in fact, what subsequently happened.  See Calad v. CIGNA 
Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 388 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 143. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2503-04. 
 144. Id. at 2503. 
 145. Id. 
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and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.”146 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court decision set forth two principal, 
intertwined holdings.  First, the Court directly mandated that 
lawsuits by beneficiaries of most employer-sponsored health plans 
against their health insurance companies147 should be deemed to 
raise a federal question and therefore be removable to the federal 
courts even if they were purportedly based on state law.148  This 
holding concerns an area of federal civil procedure and has only a 
limited impact. 
The second, more consequential holding is that state laws that 
impose tort liability on ERISA-covered MCOs for wrongful denial of 
medical benefits are invalid.149  This holding, because of its 
substantive character, is further reaching than the procedural one.  
Both holdings are questionable readings of the controlling statutes 
and of the relevant policy considerations. 
As Justice Ginsburg intimated, few, if any, areas of law are 
more tangled than that of ERISA preemption.150  The Supreme 
Court has written extensively on this narrow issue and has 
repeatedly revised its holdings.151  To explore the topic’s intricacies, 
 
 146. Id. (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna United States Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 
(3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)). 
 147. In 2003, approximately 159-million Americans were insured under 
employer-sponsored health plans.  See Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Trends in 
Cost and Access, RESEARCH IN ACTION (Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, 
Rockville, Md.), at 1, 2 (Sept. 2004), available at 
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/empspria/ empspria.pdf.  Not all of these are 
covered by ERISA, as ERISA does not apply to plans maintained by governmental 
entities or certain churches.  29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2000). 
 148. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2495. 
 149. The Davila/Calad suit was brought against two HMOs for denial of 
allegedly necessary medical services.  The Davila/Calad holding is broad enough to 
immunize any employer sponsored health plan against tort liability for denial of 
promised benefits.  As a practical matter, tort claims, were they allowed, would 
almost always be confined to HMOs on account of medical necessity denials.  This 
is because the practice of prospective utilization review is largely confined to 
HMOs, and that practice is what generally gives rise to tort claims in the managed 
care context.  See supra Part I.B.  However, managed care plans other than HMOs 
also engage in utilization review, and such review could, on occasion, give rise to a 
tort claim.  See Rubin-Schneiderman v. Merit Behavioral Care Corp., No. 00 Civ. 
8101, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14811 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2003) (tort claim made 
against preferred provider organization, another type of managed care entity). 
 150. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 151. At least twenty Supreme Court decisions, not counting Davila/Calad, have 
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the analysis of Davila/Calad must follow a twisted and somewhat 
tortuous path.  The basic points are: (1) the Davila/Calad decision 
is inconsistent with a specific statutory provision, ERISA section 
514(b); (2) the decision is inconsistent with several considerations 
of public policy, as enunciated in numerous Supreme Court 
decisions and in ERISA itself; and (3) the rationales that support 
the Court’s holding are flimsy. 
A. The Procedural Holding: Removal Jurisdiction Through 
Recharacterization of State Law Claims 
With minor exceptions, federal courts only have such 
jurisdiction as is granted by specific Congressional enactments.152  
The underlying jurisdictional law cited in Davila/Calad was 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, the federal question statute, which provides that 
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the . . . laws     . . .  of the United States.”153 
Consistent with the constitutional doctrine that national 
governmental powers are limited in nature,154 federal jurisdictional 
statutes, including the federal question statute, are construed 
against the exercise of federal court jurisdiction.155  One aspect of 
this doctrine of strict statutory construction is the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, which was first recognized in Louisville & Nashville 
Railroad v. Mottley.156  In that case, the complaint alleged a claim 
 
decided the appropriate scope of ERISA preemption, under varying 
circumstances.  See KAHP, 538 U.S. 329 (2003); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. 
Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001); UNUM 
Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 
(1997); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997); 
Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 
316 (1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Ins., 514 U.S. 645 (1995); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. 
Bank, 510 U.S. 86 (1993); District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 
U.S. 125 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); FMC 
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 
(1989); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988); 
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983);  Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981). 
 152. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 153. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
 154. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). 
 155. Kresberg v. Int’l Paper Co., 149 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 
326 U.S. 764 (1945). 
 156. 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
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based on state law.157  It further alleged that the defense would be 
based on a federal law, which in turn was alleged to be invalid 
under the United States Constitution.158  The Supreme Court held 
that such pleading did not give rise to federal question jurisdiction 
because the complaint would have been sufficient if it had merely 
asserted the state law claim without anticipating the federal 
defense.159  The nature of the underlying claim and not the 
defenses defined the legal issues for purposes of jurisdiction.160 
The well-pleaded complaint rule has been defined as follows: 
“a case will be said to ‘arise under’ federal law only if the presence 
of the federal issue or issues can be ascertained from the plaintiff’s 
well-pleaded complaint, that is, a complaint that does not 
anticipate possible federal defenses that the defendant might 
raise.”161  Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,162 a suit by a union employee 
against an employer, found the state law not to be preempted and 
gave the following rationale for the rule: 
[T]he presence of a federal question . . . in a defensive 
argument does not overcome the paramount policies 
embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule—that the 
plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that a federal 
question must appear on the face of the complaint, and 
that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on 
federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state 
court.163 
A preemption defense, based on the invalidity of the state law 
that underlies a claim, is deemed affirmative in nature.164  It must 
be specifically raised in the defensive pleadings, and ordinarily it 
will not, by itself, justify removal jurisdiction.165 
The well-pleaded complaint rule is also justified on the 
grounds of consistency.  While the plaintiff can choose between a 
federal or a state forum, that choice is determined according to the 
 
    157.   Id.  
 158. Id. at 150-52. 
 159. Id. at 153-54. 
 160. Id. 
 161. 15 JAMES WM. MOORE & DANIEL R. COQUILLETE, MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE § 103.40 (3d ed. 1997). 
 162. 482 U.S. 386 (1987). 
 163. Id. at 398-99. 
 164. 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1271 n.56 (3d ed. 1992). 
 165. Id. 
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nature of the claim, rather than the vagaries of the pleadings.166  
Furthermore, it is straightforward and relatively easy to apply.  
Certainly, it has attained a historical validity and has become 
generally appreciated as a desirable aspect of federalism.167 
In addition to statutes that allow plaintiffs to obtain original 
federal court jurisdiction, the removal laws allow defendants to 
have cases transferred from state to federal courts.  The provisions 
purportedly justifying removal in the Davila/Calad case were 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b), which state as follows: 
§ 1441. Actions removable generally 
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of 
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of 
which the district courts of the United States have original 
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 
defendants, to the district court of the United States for 
the district and division embracing the place where such 
action is pending.  For purposes of removal under this 
chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under 
fictitious names shall be disregarded. 
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have 
original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising 
under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United 
States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship 
or residence of the parties.  Any other such action shall be 
removable only if none of the parties in interest properly 
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in 
which such action is brought.168 
Removal jurisdiction is generally disfavored,169 and 
uncertainties in the application of these statutes are resolved in 
support of remand.170  This construction mirrors that of the statutes 
giving rise to original federal jurisdiction.  It follows the 
 
 166. 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3522 (2d ed. 1987). 
 167. The well-pleaded complaint rule has nevertheless been criticized as a 
doctrine that “makes no sense.”  15 MOORE, supra note 161, § 103.41. 
 168. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a),(b) (2000). 
 169. 16 MOORE, supra note 161, §107.06. 
 170. Removal from the state to the federal courts is accomplished by the 
defendant’s filing of a notice of removal with the clerk of the state court.  Removal 
is non-discretionary.  28 U.S.C. § 1446.  To undo the removal, the plaintiff moves 
for remandment with the federal court, which then considers whether it has the 
necessary jurisdiction.  The court may also remand sua sponte, if it determines that 
it lacks jurisdiction.  28 U.S.C. § 1447. 
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constitutional precepts that the federal government was created 
with limited powers and that the federal courts should have only 
such jurisdiction as Congress granted them.171 
Apart from these constitutional considerations, strict 
construction of the removal statute is justified by concerns of 
judicial efficiency.  An order denying a motion to remand, being 
interlocutory, is ordinarily not appealable until after the entry of 
final judgment.172  If, following denial of remand, the court of 
appeals determines that the case should have been remanded for 
lack of federal court jurisdiction, the judgment on the merits must 
also be vacated.173  If the remand order was incorrect, then the 
defendant may have lost the right to litigate in federal court,174 but 
the ultimate state court judgment will not suffer from a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.175  Thus, an improper remand is less 
wasteful of judicial resources than an improper denial of a request 
for a remand. 
Furthermore, because original jurisdiction statutes and 
removal jurisdiction statutes are both construed against federal 
court jurisdiction, they are easy to apply and understand.  The 
federal courts do not need to reconcile competing policy 
considerations because the considerations are identical under both 
statutes.  Until the Supreme Court created an exception to these 
jurisdictional rules, the rules gave a consistent result across all 
actions. 
If exception is to be made, as Davila/Calad itself suggests, the 
exception should be based on a “clear” and not a speculative 
reading of congressional intent.176  Or, as Justice Frankfurter said: 
Federal legislation . . . cannot therefore be construed 
without regard to the implications of our dual system of 
government     . . . . [I]t is not to be assumed as a matter of 
course that when Congress adopts a new scheme for 
federal . . . regulation, it deals with all situations falling 
within the general mischief which gave rise to the 
legislation . . . . [W]hen the Federal Government takes 
over . . . and thereby radically readjusts the balance of 
state and national authority, those charged with the duty 
 
 171. 16 MOORE, supra note 161, §107.05. 
 172. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 173. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1981). 
 174. An order of remand is generally not appealable.  28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). 
 175. 16 MOORE, supra note 161, §107.05. 
 176. 124 S. Ct. at 2494-95. 
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of legislating [must be] reasonably explicit.177 
The strength of the Supremacy Clause is not undermined by 
this analysis.178  In deciding whether a case is decided by a state or a 
federal court, a rule established by state law must give way to a 
conflicting rule established by federal law.179  The only issue 
addressed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, and by the rules of 
construction applicable to the federal question and removal 
statutes, is who should make these decisions—a state court or a 
federal one. 
The Davila/Calad case espoused a radical exception to these 
restricted views of federal court jurisdiction, holding that the 
Davila/Calad claims fell within Avco’s “complete preemption” 
doctrine.180  In a suit by a beneficiary against an employer-
sponsored health insurance plan, the court, not the plaintiff, 
should be the master of the complaint.  The benefits of orderliness, 
judicial efficiency, and ease of understanding should not be 
determinative.  Federalist concerns are trumped because ERISA, 
supposedly, shows that Congress intended an exception to the 
traditional rules of pleading and the construction of jurisdictional 
statutes. 
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B),181 which the Court  interpreted as 
creating an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, is as 
follows: 
A civil action may be brought—(1) by a participant or 
beneficiary— . . . (B) to recover benefits due to him 
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under 
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future 
benefits under the terms of the plan.182 
This statute says nothing about jurisdiction or about re-
characterization of pleadings. ERISA section 502(e)(1),183 however, 
speaks directly to jurisdiction.  ERISA section 502(e)(1) says (in 
 
 177. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. 
REV. 527, 540 (1947). 
 178. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560-61 (1968).  Avco was 
based on LMRA §301.  It  held that any suit brought to enforce a collective 
bargaining agreement is inherently federal in character, even if the complaint 
purports to be based solely on state law.  Id.  The case did not use the expression 
“complete preemption.” 
 181. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 182. Id. 
 183. ERISA § 502(e)(1),  29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). 
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relevant part): 
Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this 
section [viz., ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)], the district 
courts of the United States shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter . . . .  
State courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts 
of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of 
actions under paragraphs (1)(B) and (7) of subsection 
(a) . . . .184 
Therefore, Congress specifically said that the state and federal 
courts would have concurrent jurisdiction over suits brought under 
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B).185  Congress did not say whether state 
law causes of action against HMOs should be recharacterized as 
federal pleadings.  The statute does suggest, however, that 
Congress was not concerned with preventing state courts from 
hearing lawsuits by plan beneficiaries against employer sponsored 
health plans.  The inferences from ERISA section 502(e)(1) and 
the pertinent policy considerations imply that Congressional intent 
regarding federal court jurisdiction was not the clear mandate the 
Court invoked. 
In fact, the main challenge to the procedural holding does not 
lie in either the implications to be drawn from ERISA section 
502(e)(1) or in the general policy considerations applicable to 
federal question jurisdiction.  Rather, the main challenge to the 
procedural holding lies in the specific language of ERISA section 
514,186 which explicitly defines the intended scope of ERISA 
preemption.  Here, the procedural issues become intertwined with 
the substance of the statute, and so the analysis moves to the 
substantive holding.  A later section discusses how that decision 
impacts the jurisdictional holding.187 
B. The Substantive Holding: Invalidity of the Tort Liability Provisions of 
the Texas Health Care Liability Act 
The main impact of the Davila/Calad case is not its 
jurisdictional holding.  Far and away, Davila/Calad’s primary effect 
is the determination that ERISA preempts and thus invalidates state 
laws that purport to impose tort liability against HMOs.  On this, 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.; ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 186. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144. 
 187. See infra Part III.B.1.c. 
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the primary aspect of the case, the Court’s reasoning was 
significantly wanting. 
 




On the substantive issue, the Davila/Calad Court stated that 
“‘[t]he six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found 
in §502(a) of the [ERISA] statute . . . provide strong evidence that 
Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply 
forgot to incorporate expressly.’”188  In addition, the Court held 
that “any state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or 
supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the 
clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and 
is therefore pre-empted.” 189 
As can be readily seen by cursory inspection, there are nine, 
not six, civil enforcement provisions in ERISA section 502(a).190  It 
is possible, though, that the Court was referring to provisions 1, 2, 
3, 4, 8, and 9,191 which allow enforcement by private persons, as “the 
six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions.”192  Regardless 
of how one does the counting, if ERISA section 502(a) were viewed 
in a vacuum, an inference of implied preemption of all state 
remedies would be reasonable.  Whether the evidence for such 
inference is “strong” and whether the Congressional intent is 
“clear,” as the Court maintains, are questionable points, but, 
hyperbole aside, the conclusion is certainly defendable.  Expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the 
exclusion of another) is an accepted and justifiable rule of statutory 
construction.193 
The primary determinant of Congressional intent must be the 
statutory language itself, viewed in its entirety.194  No section of the 
 
 188. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 
481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)). 
 189. Id.  ERISA § 502(a) is attached to this article as Exhibit A. 
 190. ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)-(9), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132 (a)(1)-(9). 
 191. ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)-(4), (8), (9), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132 (a)(1)-(4), (8), (9). 
 192. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 
481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)). 
 193. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (citing 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 
U.S. 163, 168 (1993)). 
 194. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993). 
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statute should be viewed in isolation, but all relevant provisions 
must be considered.195  Thus, section 502(a) should not be read in 
isolation from other sections of ERISA. 
Congress specifically spoke to which state laws are to be 
preempted and which are not.  The Court did not have to infer 
anything, and it did not have to decide whether evidence was 
strong or whether the implied legislative intent was clear.  Nothing 
was left for deep legal analysis, except how to interpret the words 
Congress had written.  While such interpretation has turned out to 
be difficult, that should have been the starting point (and, in fact, 
the ending point as well).  The applicable provisions are located in 
ERISA sections 514(a) and (b).196 
Section 514(a) declares that ERISA is to supersede state laws 
which “relate to” employee benefit plans (with the exception of 
those plans described in ERISA section 4(b), which are relatively 
few in number and are irrelevant to the present discussion).197  On 
its face, this appears to be broad language.  However, section 
514(b)(2)(A), the key provision for purposes of this article, states 
in relevant part that, with one exception, “nothing in this title 
[ERISA] shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from 
any law of any State which regulates insurance . . . .”198  Section 
514(b)(2)(A) is sometimes called “the insurance savings clause” or 
simply the “savings clause.”199  Section 514(b)(2)(A) is an exception 
to section 514(a).  It says that some state regulations, even if they 
relate to employee benefit plans, are not to be preempted.200  
Section 514(b)(2)(B), called the “deemer clause,”201  is the one 
exception to (or at least a limitation on) section 514(b)(2)(A).202 
Although the preemptive force of ERISA seems to be a narrow, 
technical issue, the Supreme Court has devoted enormous effort to 
 
 195. United States Nat’l. Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 
U.S. 439, 454-55 (1993); Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 223 (1984). 
 196. ERISA §§ 514(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), (b).  The relevant portions of 
ERISA § 514 are attached to this article as Exhibit B. 
 197. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
 198. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 733 (1985) 
(coining the term “deemer clause”). 
 202. Thus, state laws are valid, except as they relate to ERISA plans, except as 
they are saved, except as the “deemer clause” applies.  The deemer clause, then, is 
an exception to an exception to an exception.  Each step of this analysis is 
technical and complicated. 
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construing ERISA section 514.203  Older cases interpreting this 
language gave an expansive reading to section 514(a) and, 
conversely, a narrow reading to the Insurance Savings Clause.204  
Starting with its decision in Travelers,205 however, the Court has 
adopted a much more restrictive reading of section 514(a).206  
Recognizing that a literal, dictionary interpretation of the “relate 
to” language of section 514(a) can lead to absurd results, the Court 
inferred certain limitations to section 514(a), particularly in areas 
of the law that may have only an indirect effect on the regulation of 
employee benefit plans.  Furthermore, in areas “traditionally 
occupied by the States” there is a “starting presumption that 
Congress does not intend to supplant state law.”207  Concomitantly, 
with its contraction of section 514(a), the Court has expanded the 
scope of the Insurance Savings Clause.208 
b. Application to the Substantive Holding 
THCLA singles out MCOs, including HMOs, for tort liability.  
The Court in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.209 held that any state law 
having a connection with or making a reference to covered 
employee benefit plans falls within section 514(a).210  While later 
Court decisions have refined and clarified the Shaw holding,211 the 
case has never been overturned.  In light of the directness of the 
connection between THCLA and ERISA-covered health plans, it 
would be reasonable to argue that THCLA sections 88.001-88.003, 
in the context of Davila/Calad, “relate to” an employer-sponsored 
benefit plan.212 
 
 203. See supra note 151. 
 204. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 
(1987). 
 205. N.Y.  State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins., 
514 U.S. 645, 661-62 (1995). 
 206. See, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 
(1997); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997). 
 207. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654-55. 
 208. See, e.g., Ky. Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003) 
[hereinafter KAHP]; Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); 
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999). 
 209. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
 210. Id. at 100. 
 211. See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 645. 
 212. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 88.001-.003 (West 2004).  In anticipation 
of its later holding in Roark v. Humana, 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth 
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The catch, however, is that the insurance savings clause 
establishes specific exceptions to the general preemption rule of 
ERISA section 514(a).213  A state law “which regulates insurance” is 
not to be preempted.214  The Court has grappled at length with the 
term “regulates insurance.”  Both of those words are technical in 
nature, and so the Court has developed (and then repeatedly 
modified) various formulas to define those terms within the 
context of the insurance savings clause.  Thus, it requires some 
analysis to determine whether THCLA sections 88.001-88.003 fall 
within that clause, and it requires even more analysis to consider 
what effect, if any, the deemer clause should have on the final 
result.215 
The two most recent Supreme Court interpretations of the 
insurance savings clause strongly suggest that the tort liability 
provisions of THCLA should have been saved from preemption.216  
In KAHP, the Court held that a state law regulates insurance if (1) 
it is specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance and 
(2) it “substantially affect[s] the risk pooling arrangement between 
the insurer and the insured.”217  THCLA section 88.002(a) imposes 
liability against “[a] health insurance carrier, health maintenance 
organization, or other managed care entity.”218  In Rush Prudential, 
the Court held that an HMO is an insurer for insurance savings 
clause purposes. 219   Therefore, THCLA should satisfy the first 
KAHP requirement. THCLA almost certainly meets the second 
 
Circuit in Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance, 215 F.3d 
526, 534 (2000), rehearing denied, 220 F.3d 641 (2000), vacated in part on other 
grounds, sub nom., Montemayor v. Corporate Health Insurance, 536 U.S. 935 (2002), 
found that THCLA was primarily directed toward health care treatment decisions 
and only incidentally directed toward administration of insurance coverage.   
Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 534 (5th Cir. 2000), 
rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated in part on 
other grounds, sub nom., Montemayor v. Corporate Health Ins., 536 U.S. 935 (2002).  
Thus, it held, THCLA was not related to ERISA-covered plans for purposes of 
ERISA § 514(a).  If THCLA were deemed not even to "relate to" an ERISA-covered 
plan, of course, that would be all the more reason to find it was not completely 
preempted.  Id. 
 213. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). 
 214. This disregards the “deemer clause.”  See supra notes 202-03 and 
accompanying text regarding the deemer clause. 
 215. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 88.001-.003 (West 2004); see supra note 
203. 
 216. See  KAHP, 538 U.S. at 329; Rush Prudential HMO, 536 U.S. at 363-64. 
 217. KAHP, 538 U.S. at 338. 
 218. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a) (Vernon 1997). 
 219. Rush Prudential HMO, 536 U.S. at 366-67. 
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KAHP requirement as well because THCLA mandates that 
managed care entities, rather than insureds, must incur the tort 
damages that ensue from insurers’ failure to exercise ordinary care 
when making health care treatment decisions.220  Because the 
statute shifts this risk between the parties, THCLA should fall 
within the KAHP criteria for the insurance savings clause. 
If the plans are underwritten by an employer rather than an 
insurance carrier, the deemer clause is construed to exempt health 
insurance plans from the insurance savings clause.221  In such 
situations, an insurance company may provide administrative 
services for the plan, but benefit payments come from the 
employer’s resources.  If the health insurance plan is funded by an 
insurance company, then the deemer clause does not apply.222 
Davila/Calad was decided under the four corners of the 
pleadings, and neither the Calad complaint nor the Davila 
complaint alleged whether it was the employer or the insurance 
company who funded the health plan.  Because such allegation is 
extraneous to a cause of action under THCLA (and, in general, the 
funding source would probably not even be known to a plaintiff at 
the time of filing a complaint), there would be no basis for 
assuming employer funding.  In any event, Aetna, in its Supreme 
Court brief, stated that it had funded Mr. Davila’s health insurance 
policy.223  Accordingly, the deemer clause did not apply in this 
lawsuit, and the insurance savings clause should have saved the 
claim from preemption, complete or otherwise. 
c. Reconsideration of the Procedural Holding 
As previously suggested, the main argument against the 
Court’s procedural holding comes from the specific language of 
ERISA section 514.224  Whether the insurance savings clause is read 
broadly or narrowly, and regardless of the scope of the deemer 
clause, the insurance savings clause must mean something.  
Congress has made the announcement explicitly: if a state law 
 
 220. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a). 
 221. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 746-47 (1985). 
 222. See id. 
 223. Brief for Petitioner Aetna Health Inc. at 6-7, Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 
124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 02-1845).   The CIGNA brief did not indicate who 
funded the Calad plan benefits. See Brief for Petitioner CIGNA Healthcare of 
Texas, Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 03-83). 
 224. See supra note 195-99 and accompanying text. 
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regulates insurance (however that term is defined), then, subject to 
the limitations of the deemer clause, ERISA does not invalidate it.225 
This point, by itself, should dispose of the Davila/Calad 
procedural holding.  The Court found that Congress intended so 
thoroughly to occupy the area of law covered by a beneficiary’s 
right to seek redress against an employer-sponsored health 
insurance plan that no state law in this area could possibly stand.  
Nothing in the language of the insurance savings clause, however, 
remotely suggests that Congress intended to exclude any category 
of state laws that regulate insurance from its ambit, even if those 
laws might expand on the remedies specified under section 
502(a).226  To say, as the Court did, that no state remedial statute 
could possibly be saved is simply to discard the language of the 
insurance savings clause. 
d. The Davila/Calad Rationale 
The Davila/Calad decision never determined whether THCLA 
was a law that regulates insurance.  The Court simply concluded 
that the insurance savings clause argument “is unavailing.”227  The 
Court cited two previous decisions for the proposition that 
Congress intended the ERISA section 502(a)228 remedies to be 
exclusive.229  Citing Pilot Life Insurance Co v. Dedeaux, the Court 
stated that “the policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain 
remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme 
would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and 
beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that 
Congress rejected in ERISA.”230 
The Court refused to acknowledge that Congress had not 
rejected all state law remedies under ERISA, as it had specifically 
saved state laws that regulate insurance.  Similarly, the Court did 
not explain why validation of state insurance laws which allow tort 
liability for negligent denial of plan benefits would “completely 
undermine” the federal scheme.  Rather than establish a principled 
basis for discarding the insurance savings clause, the Court relied 
 
 225. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000). 
 226. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 
 227. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2500. 
 228. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 2495 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 418 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)). 
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on circular reasoning.231  Specific statutory language was not to be 
the indicium of Congressional intent in this case because earlier 
decisions had stated that such language would not be 
determinative. 
In other interpretations of ERISA’s preemption effects, the 
Court has repeatedly reconsidered, and at times rightly rejected, 
the language and rationale of prior opinions.232  This area of the 
law is so important that the Court subordinated stare decisis to the 
public need for a fair and understandable reading of the ERISA 
statute.  In Davila/Calad, though, the Court defeated a specific 
Congressional directive.  Although the Court ruled consistently 
with some of its earlier decisions, it undermined much of its own 
progress. 
2. Policy Considerations 
The Davila/Calad holding precluded all but the ERISA-
prescribed remedies for the vast majority of employee benefit 
plans.  Rejection of specific statutory language is reason enough to 
question the decision.  However, while statutory language is 
generally the sine qua non of Congressional intent,233 legislative 
construction may also be guided by the overall structure and 
objects of the law.234  It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider the 
practical consequences of the substantive Davila/Calad holding.  
These consequences should be examined in light of the declared 
Congressional policies that motivated ERISA and of the policy 
considerations that the Court itself articulated. 
a. Strengthening and Broadening the Social Safety Net 
The “Congressional findings and declaration of policy” set 
forth in ERISA section 2, indicate concerns for “disclosure” of 
 
 231. See id. 
 232. See De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814 
(1997); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 649 (1995) (reconsidering the meaning of “relate 
to” in ERISA §§  514(a) and (b)); KAHP, 538 U.S. at 335; UNUM Life Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 364 (1999) (reformulating the scope of the insurance 
savings clause). 
 233. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993) (citing Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982)). 
 234. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655; United States Nat'l. Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. 
Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 454-55 (1993). 
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expected benefits to employees, “minimum standards . . . assuring 
the equitable character of such plans,” and “responsibility” to the 
beneficiaries of those charged with administering employee benefit 
plans. 235  Consistent with ERISA’s primary focus on retirement 
income security, section 2 speaks most directly to pension plans.  
Nevertheless, it is certainly reasonable to expect that Congress, by 
including welfare plans within ERISA’s coverage, wished to 
enhance the principles of disclosure, equity, and administrative 
responsibility for employer sponsored health insurance plans.  
THCLA is a reasonable means for accomplishing those objectives. 
THCLA section 88.002(d) specifies that it will not impose tort 
liability on managed care plans for failure to provide treatment that 
is not covered by the health care plan.236  Thus, managed care plans 
have an incentive to disclose the treatment they will or will not 
cover.  For example, CIGNA could have posted a statement on its 
web site that it will generally refuse to pay for more than one day’s 
hospital stay following a hysterectomy, and Aetna could likewise 
have posted the details of its prescription drug formulary and step-
therapy program.  The HMOs could have also posted a general 
statement that their internal determinations of appropriate 
medical treatment could in some cases lead to a lower standard of 
health care than might be recommended by the members’ treating 
physicians.  If these coverage restrictions were clearly disclosed to 
the employer and the plan beneficiaries before they purchased 
health insurance, the HMOs would have had a clear defense to the 
THCLA claims under the Davila and Calad scenarios. 
Likewise, THCLA promotes equity in plan coverage decisions 
by providing that a managed care plan which fails to exercise 
ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions will pay 
the resulting damages to those plan beneficiaries harmed by such 
failure.237  THCLA also promotes responsibility in health insurance 
plan administrators.  ERISA section 502(a)238 remedies for wrongful 
coverage denials in the Davila and Calad situations are essentially 
non-existent.  Under those remedies, CIGNA could be required to 
pay Calad the cost of an extra day’s stay in the hospital, and Aetna 
could be required to pay Davila the cost of a few weeks’ supply of 
Vioxx.  These contract remedies, of course, bear almost no 
 
 235. ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a)-(b) (2000). 
 236. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(d) (Vernon 1997). 
 237. Id. § 88.002(a). 
 238. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
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relationship to the personal injuries suffered.239 
In a more general sense, THCLA might broaden and 
strengthen the social safety net.  It would encourage HMOs to be 
more cognizant of those members, such as Davila and Calad, who 
might not meet standard patient profiles.  It would make it more 
likely that medically vulnerable persons are given care that is 
suitable for their needs.  It would also ensure that when people are 
injured because of negligent medical necessity decisions, the 
burdens arising from those injuries can be spread among a broad 
population base. 
The arguments for extra-contractual remedies against health 
insurers are similar to but, perhaps, stronger than the arguments 
for extra-contractual remedies against any insurer in the non-HMO 
context.  Ordinarily, a dispute between an insured and an insurer 
takes the form of an argument over money after the fact, with no 
consequences other than who should have the money.  The loss, 
whatever it may be, is relatively fixed.240  With an HMO, the dispute 
is generally over prospective care.  The potential consequences to 
the insured are partly financial but may also include injury to 
health, or even to life, resulting from a deprivation of necessary 
medical care. 
At the same time, though, substantial arguments can be made 
against the imposition of tort liability for an improper denial of 
health insurance coverage.  THCLA seeks to impose an objective 
“ordinary care” or “ordinary prudence” standard of liability.241  On 
its face, this seems reasonable enough.  In practice, however, the 
application of the law to a specific fact situation will depend on the 
judicial process.  While that process may support goals of social 
equity, it will also engender significant monetary and other costs 
for those involved.  Tort litigation is a spectacularly expensive and 
inefficient undertaking, and it might be worthwhile for the health 
care system to suffer a modest level of inequity if doing so would 
avoid those costs. 
Reasonable doubts could be raised about the inherent fairness 
 
 239. Presumably, although not necessarily, CIGNA and Aetna had to bear most 
or all of the medical bills resulting from their alleged failure to exercise 
reasonable care.  The injuries suffered by Davila and Calad, however, went far 
beyond the cost of their medical treatment.  See Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2493. 
 240. 16A JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 
8878 (1981) (pointing out that any delay in receipt of insurance proceeds is likely 
to cause some accretion of the loss). 
 241. See supra Part I.C. 
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of a jury verdict in a case brought against a health insurance 
company by those who have suffered serious medical injuries.  In 
the Davila and Calad situations, the members’ physicians 
recommended treatments based primarily on their patients’ 
welfare.  There is no simple way to ascertain the regard they had 
for the financial burdens associated with their recommendations.  
The HMOs, on the other hand, gave substantial weight to the costs 
of the proposed treatments.  They may have determined that the 
physicians’ recommendations were medically desirable but not 
strictly medically necessary.  From the position of society as a whole, 
this is a reasonable way of allocating medical resources.  Viewing 
the matter with hindsight, however, a jury might be disinclined to 
defer to the HMOs’ judgments.  The situation invites a prejudicial 
verdict.  Plan sponsors might be unwilling to bear these 
uncertainties and might decline to provide their employees with 
health insurance.  Thus, THCLA could have the undesired effect of 
actually shrinking the social safety net. 
Also, in most circumstances patients could pay for the medical 
care the HMO denied them and then sue for reimbursement of the 
costs under ERISA.242  Mrs. Calad’s physician should have explained 
to her the basis for his recommendation that she spend an extra 
day in the hospital, and Mr. Davila’s physician should have 
explained to him why he thought Vioxx was a more appropriate 
medication than Naprosyn.243  Unless the patients were completely 
devoid of financial resources, they could have followed their 
physicians’ advice, paid for the medical care out of their own 
pockets, and then sued for the wrongfully denied coverage.244  
While patients who buy insurance coverage to protect against 
medical bills may feel imposed upon when their reasonable 
payment requests are denied, it is not irrational to expect them to 
mitigate their damages.  Thus, the injuries of Calad and Davila may 
 
 242. ERISA § 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (providing for the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees in such a suit, within the court's discretion). 
 243. Under the AMA Code of Medical Ethics, physicians are required to inform 
their patients of the benefits, risks, and costs of appropriate treatment alternatives.  
AM. MED. ASS’N, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL 
AFFAIRS, E-10.01, (issued June 1992, updated 1993), at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/noindex /category/11760.html. 
 244. One study found that among elderly patients with osteoarthritis, the 
strongest predictor of Cox-2 inhibitor drug usage was the patient's insurance 
coverage rather than clinical criteria.  Jalpa A. Doshi et al., The Impact of Drug 
Coverage on COX-2 Inhibitor Use in Medicare, HEALTH AFFAIRS (2004), at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/ hlthaff.w4.94v1?ck=nck. 
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have resulted partly from their personal decisions as well as from 
the HMOs’ decisions. 
In the abstract then, the reasons for allowing tort liability 
against HMOs are countered by equally weighty reasons for 
disallowing such liability.  Whether, in practice, the policy 
considerations would remain in balance, or whether one set of 
principles would be seen to predominate over the other cannot be 
known except through experience. 
The federalist structure of American government is well-suited 
to handle such issues.  If there is no consensus on a problem of 
legal economics, the matter can be left to the states.  One state may 
try one solution, and another state may try a different solution.  
Each state’s government represents and is responsible to its own 
citizens.245 
With experience, a consensus may emerge as to what is the 
most desirable solution to a social problem, and most, or even all, 
states may adopt that consensus solution.  Alternatively, what may 
be found desirable in one state might be rejected in another, and 
the state laws may disagree.  If there is such disagreement, each 
state will have chosen the laws that it deems, rightly or wrongly, best 
suited for its own governance.  As the oft-quoted dissent in New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann246 puts the matter: “It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if 
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”247 
As a general matter, there is little uniformity among state 
insurance laws about the scope of the insured’s remedies in the 
non-HMO context for wrongful coverage denials.  Some states 
simply allow ordinary contract damages,248 others allow an element 
of punitive damages,249 and others have other remedies.250  
Congress was undoubtedly aware of this variation among state 
insurance laws when it enacted ERISA.  Through the insurance 
savings clause, it endorsed their application of state insurance laws 
to plans covered under ERISA. 
The Davila/Calad holding precludes a federalist experiment 
 
 245. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997). 
 246. 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
 247. Id. at 311. (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 248. APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN,  supra note 240, § 8878.15. 
 249. Id. § 8878.65. 
 250. Id. §§ 8878.35 (consequential damages), 8878.55 (damages for mental 
and emotional distress). 
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on remedies against HMOs.  States may not test and compare the 
benefits and disadvantages of tort liability statutes or other types of 
remedies.  States must accept the ERISA section 502 remedies as 
exclusive.  Davila/Calad undercuts one of the significant strengths 
of the American form of government—a strength that is well-
designed to address the very problems that motivated ERISA’s 
passage. 
b. National Uniformity 
Congress, by enacting ERISA, federalized the law applying to 
employee benefit plans to in order to reduce or eliminate some of 
the disuniformities that would otherwise force national plans 
entering into local markets to purchase insurance.251  Thus, if a 
nationwide employer with employees in a state with a THCLA-type 
statute wished to establish an HMO for its employees, the employer 
would have to provide a somewhat different mix of benefits to its 
employees on a state by state basis.  Specifically, employees in states 
with THCLA-type laws would be entitled to tort remedies for 
breach of promised health care benefits, whereas employees in 
states without such laws would not have these rights.  Employers 
might find the inability to provide a uniform benefits package to be 
a disincentive to the creation of the welfare plan.  It might 
therefore be argued that enforcement of THCLA would undercut a 
principal purpose of ERISA—encouragement of employer-
sponsored benefit plans. 
The problem with this argument is that it simply reads the 
insurance savings clause out of ERISA.  In Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co. v. Massachusetts,252 the Court stated: 
We also are aware that [Metropolitan Life’s] construction 
of the statute would eliminate some of the disuniformities 
currently facing national plans that enter into local 
markets to purchase insurance.  Such disuniformities, 
however, are the inevitable result of the congressional 
decision to “save” local insurance regulation.  Arguments 
as to the wisdom of these policy choices must be directed 
at Congress.253 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly employed the insurance 
 
 251. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins., 
514 U.S. 645, 656-58 (1995). 
 252. 471 U.S. 724 (1985). 
 253. Id. at 747. 
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savings clause to enforce state laws that effectively require 
nationwide employers to provide non-uniform national benefits.254  
Logically, the advantages of national uniformity should yield to the 
force of the insurance savings clause when it comes to remedial 
measures, just as the advantages of national uniformity have yielded 
to the insurance savings clause in other areas of insurance 
regulation. 
c. Upsetting the Regulatory Applecart 
The Davila/Calad opinion observes: 
Congress enacted ERISA to protect . . . the interests of 
participants in employee benefit plans and their 
beneficiaries by setting out substantive regulatory 
requirements for employee benefit plans and to provid[e] 
for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to 
the Federal courts.  The purpose of ERISA is to provide a 
uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.  
To this end, ERISA includes expansive pre-emption 
provisions . . . .255 
From this premise, the opinion concludes that the section 502 
remedies are part of a “uniform regulatory regime,” and are 
“essential to accomplish Congress’ purpose of creating a 
comprehensive statute for the regulation of employee benefit 
plans.”256 
The problem with this argument is that it may hold true for 
pension plans, but it does not apply to welfare plans.  ERISA 
regulates the procedural standards and content of pension plans 
closely.  While ERISA provides similar procedural safeguards for 
welfare plans, it does not regulate their substantive content at all.257  
As applied to welfare plans, then, ERISA cannot be fairly deemed 
“a comprehensive statute despite the Court’s assertions.”258 
The insurance savings clause provides a mechanism for filling 
 
 254. E.g., id. (mental health benefits); KAHP, 538 U.S. at 341-42 (access to any 
qualified provider willing to enter into the insurance carrier’s provider panel 
contract); Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran,  536 U.S. 355 (2002) (acceptance 
of medical necessity determinations by an independent physician—one not on the 
HMO panel of physicians). 
 255. 124 S. Ct. at 2495 (inner quotation marks and statutory citations 
omitted). 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts., 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985). 
 258. See Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2495. 
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the regulatory gap ERISA has left uncovered—state insurance laws.  
Such laws have been commonplace since well before the enactment 
of ERISA.259  Thus, the fairest reading of ERISA, both from the 
language of the statute and the historical perspective, is that 
employer-sponsored health insurance policies were to be regulated 
by a conjunction of state and federal laws.  From this viewpoint, a 
rule that invalidates those state remedial laws which regulate the 
insurance industry has the effect of upsetting the overall regulatory 
scheme.260  The Court’s conclusion, that “the federal scheme would 
be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and 
beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that 
Congress rejected in ERISA,” does not stand up.261 
3. Comparison of the Language of ERISA with the Language of 
LMRA 
Davila/Calad emphasized “the similarity of the language used 
in [LMRA] and ERISA” to justify the Avco complete preemption 
doctrine in the ERISA section 502(a) context.262  The Court cited 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor263 to support its statement.  
Taylor, in turn, said that the “closely parallel” language was to be 
found in ERISA section 502(f) and LMRA section 301(a).264 
ERISA section 502(f) states that “[t]he district courts of the 
United States shall have jurisdiction, without respect to the amount 
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to grant the relief 
provided for in subsection (a) of this section [ERISA section 
502(a)] in any action.”265 
LMRA section 301(a) states: 
(a) Venue, amount, and citizenship.  Suits for violation of 
contracts between an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees in an industry affecting 
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such 
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court 
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, 
 
 259. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 742 (1985). 
 260. Id. at 750. 
 261. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 
481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)). 
 262. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). 
 263. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct at 2495. 
 264. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 59 (1987). 
 265. ERISA § 502(f), 29 U.S.C. §1132(f) (2000). 
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without respect to the amount in controversy or without 
regard to the citizenship of the parties.266 
There is nothing remarkable about the language of either 
statute.  They are both simple affirmations that the district courts of 
the United States are to have non-exclusive jurisdiction over certain 
controversies, based on ERISA and LMRA, respectively.  There is 
no particular or distinctive “similarity” or “closely parallel” 
language between these two provisions. 
4. What Went Wrong: Pilot Life and Taylor 
The problem, which has come to a boil in Davila/Calad, began 
with the murky language of ERISA itself.  First, the title refers to 
retirement income, while the case itself had nothing to do with 
retirement or income.  Clearly, the statute covers more than the 
title suggests.  While the misnomer does not diminish the force of 
the law,267 it does demonstrate that Congressional thinking was 
focused outside the realm of welfare benefits. 
Second, the unvarnished language of the primary provision on 
preemption, ERISA section 514(a), is self-contradictory.  According 
to section 514(a), state laws “insofar as they may now or hereafter 
relate to any employee benefit plan” are to be preempted.268  As the 
Supreme Court ultimately observed, everything in some degree 
relates to everything else, so all state laws relate to employee benefit 
plans in some measure.  Clearly, Congress was not suggesting a 
wholesale overthrow of state law.  To imply some limitation on the 
literal language of the statute and give it sense the Court’s current 
holdings read the quoted language as though the word 
“reasonably” was before the word “relate.”269  The problem, though, 
is that it took time for the Court to wrestle with the section 514(a) 
language in various contexts, before it ultimately concluded a 
dictionary meaning was not appropriate.  While the jurisprudential 
transformation was taking place, older precedents, based at least in 
part on discarded analysis, were left standing. 
 
 266. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000). 
 267. In cases of doubt, the title of a statute can shed light on its meaning.  
Almondarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998). 
 268. ERISA § 514(a), 24 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
 269. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997); 
Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Const., N.A., Inc., 519 
U.S. 316 (1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
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The language of the other key preemption provision, the 
insurance savings clause, is also a factor.  In Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,270 the Court observed that “the saving 
clause appears broadly to preserve the States’ lawmaking power 
over much of the same regulation [that Congress had preempted 
with section 514(a)].  While Congress occasionally decides to 
return to the States what it has previously taken away, it does not 
normally do both at the same time.”271  Thus, the Court 
simultaneously had to reconcile the imprecise wording of section 
514(a) with the equally imprecise language of the insurance savings 
clause.  As indicated above,272 the struggle to hit this moving target 
led to varying formulations of the insurance savings clause. 
As a way out of this morass, the Court turned to the legislative 
history of ERISA.  Here, too, it initially found little assistance.  In 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts it noted: 
There is no discussion in that history of the relationship 
between the general pre-emption clause [section 514(a)] 
and the saving clause, and indeed very little discussion of 
the saving clause at all . . . .  [There is no] indication in 
the legislative history that Congress . . . was aware that the 
saving clause was in conflict with the general pre-emption 
provision.273 
Although the legislative history seemed so unclear in 1985, 
when Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts was decided, it 
suddenly became transparent to the Court in 1987, when it decided 
two companion cases, Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,274 and 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor.275  Pilot Life arose out of a 
disability insurance claim.276  Mr. Dedeaux had injured his back and 
claimed long term disability benefits under an employer purchased 
insurance policy with Pilot Life.277  Pilot Life originally allowed the 
claim, but it then repeatedly terminated and reinstated the 
benefits.278  Eventually, Dedeaux brought a diversity action against 
Pilot Life in federal court, alleging three counts, all based solely on 
 
 270. 471 U.S. 724 (1985). 
 271. Id. at 740. 
 272. See infra Part III.B.1.a. 
 273. 421 U.S. at 745. 
 274. 481 U.S. 41 (1987). 
 275. 481 U.S. 58 (1987). 
 276. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 41. 
 277. Id. at 43. 
 278. Id. 
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state law: tortious breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, 
and fraud in the inducement.279  He sought, inter alia, punitive 
damages and damages for mental and emotional distress.280  He did 
not raise any ERISA claims.281  The trial court granted summary 
judgment to Pilot Life, finding that all of Dedeaux’s claims had 
been preempted.282  The Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the 
Court of Appeals.283 
Pilot Life observed that “the express pre-emption provisions of 
ERISA are deliberately expansive and designed to establish pension 
plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.”284  The Court 
went on to quote Congressional sponsors of ERISA, to the effect 
that the law is “intended to preempt the field for Federal 
regulations.”285  It then held, based on the “expansive sweep of the 
pre-emption clause,” that Dedeaux’s suit came within the “relate 
to” language of section 514(a).286 
Next, Pilot Life turned to the insurance savings clause.  It 
looked at several criteria for interpreting that clause, including a 
“common-sense view” of the statutory language, and it found that 
the laws asserted in the complaint did not regulate insurance.287  
Thus, the suit was not saved from preemption.288 
Then, the Court went on to say that any state law that purports 
to establish a remedy other than as set forth in ERISA section 
502(a) would have to be preempted.  It based this conclusion partly 
on its determination that section 502(a) was intended to be “a 
comprehensive civil enforcement scheme,”289 and partly on the 
following language from the Congressional Conference Report on 
ERISA: 
Under the conference agreement, civil actions may be 
brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits 
due under the plan, to clarify rights to receive future 
benefits under the plan, and for relief from breach of 
 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 43-44. 
 281. Id. at 44. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 45-46 (inner quotation marks omitted). 
 285. Id. at 46 (inner quotation marks omitted). 
 286. Id. at 47. 
 287. Id. at 50-51. 
 288. Id. at 48-50. 
 289. Id. at 54. 
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fiduciary responsibility . . .. [W]ith respect to suits to 
enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover 
benefits under the plan which do not involve application 
of the title I provisions, they may be brought not only in 
U.S. district courts but also in State courts of competent 
jurisdiction.  All such actions in Federal or State courts are to be 
regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar 
fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947.290 
The Court also quoted a similar comment by Senator Williams, 
plus other, less pointed observations in the legislative record 
concerning the desirability of having questions concerning 
employee benefit plans be resolved without recourse to state law.291  
None of these legislative record quotations referred to the 
insurance savings clause. 
It is unclear from Pilot Life whether the Court intended to say 
that a state law that falls squarely within the insurance savings 
clause should be preempted notwithstanding the language of the 
Insurance Savings Clause or whether the Court was merely 
supporting a conclusion that the insurance savings clause should be 
read narrowly.  What the Court did say was that it divined a “clear 
expression of congressional intent that ERISA’s civil enforcement 
scheme be exclusive.”292  No mention was made that, when 
Congress was discussing preemption issues, it had not focused on 
the effect of the insurance savings clause.  More significantly, no 
mention was made that the Pilot Life Court’s reasoning required 
that a Congressional report be accorded more force than the 
statutory language itself. 
Taylor relied heavily on the Pilot Life rationale.293  It, too, was a 
claim for disability insurance benefits, although it also alleged 
claims unrelated to an employee benefit plan.294  It asserted only 
state law causes of action.295  Unlike Pilot Life (but like 
Davila/Calad), the case was brought in state court.296  The 
defendants removed the case to federal court, and the district court 
 
 290. Id. at 55 (quoting H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 327 (1974) (emphasis 
in Court opinion but not in original document)). 
 291. Id. at 56. 
 292. Id. at 57. 
 293. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,  481 U.S. 58, 62-65 (1987). 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 60. 
 296. Id. at 61. 
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granted them summary judgment on the merits.297  The court of 
appeals reversed the district court on the grounds that it lacked 
removal jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.298  
The Supreme Court then reversed, quoting the same language of 
the Congressional Conference Report that Pilot Life had quoted.299 
The Taylor court noted that “[i]n the absence of explicit 
direction from Congress, this question would be a close one.”300  
However, the Conference Report, along with the supposedly 
“closely parallel” language of ERISA section 502(f) and LMRA 
section 301(a),301 was determinative. 
Neither Pilot Life nor Taylor addressed a law, like THCLA, that 
fell specifically within the insurance savings clause.  The 
Davila/Calad decision could have distinguished these two earlier 
holdings on that basis.  Considering the sweeping language of Pilot 
Life and Taylor, though, the better course would probably have 
been a complete disavowal of the errant language (and, perhaps in 
the case of Taylor, the actual holding).  If Pilot Life and Taylor are to 
be read, as Davila/Calad ultimately did, as holding that language in 
the legislative record should be given more force than the language 
of the insurance savings clause, then those holdings were in error. 
The Court has often observed that reliance on legislative 
history to divine congressional intent is “a step to be taken 
cautiously,”302 which, as often as not, “muddies the waters.”303  
Individual members of the Court have expressed differing views 
regarding the role that legislative history should play in statutory 
interpretation.  Justice Rehnquist has opined that “the legislative 
history of a statute is a useful guide to the intent of Congress,”304 
whereas Justice Scalia has found legislative history to be “unreliable 
. . . as a genuine indicator of congressional intent.”305  At minimum, 
though, the courts should not base their decisions solely on 
legislative history, without “[a] statutory reference point.”306 
Here, there was no such reference point.  The insurance 
 
 297. Id. at 61-62. 
 298. Id. at 62. 
 299. Id. at 65-66. 
 300. Id. at 64. 
 301. See analysis supra Part III.B.3. 
 302. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977). 
 303. United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997). 
 304. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 182 (1981) (dissenting). 
 305. Wis. Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (concurring). 
 306. Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 584 (1994). 
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savings clause—“nothing in this title shall be construed to exempt 
or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates 
insurance”—is unambiguous.307  It makes no exception for private 
enforcement actions, and nothing in the quotations on which Pilot 
Life and Taylor relied suggests statutory language that might 
reasonably give rise to such an exception. 
In all likelihood, the congressional statements, including those 
in the Conference Report, suggesting a parallel between LMRA 
preemption and ERISA preemption, were geared toward the 
preemption of laws that might affect pension plans, rather than 
those laws that might affect welfare plans.308  As Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts noted, Congress, during its debates, 
gave little regard to the insurance savings clause.309  To find, then, 
that Congress intended to limit its scope in the area of private 
enforcement actions is an unfounded stretch. 
But even if the authors of the Conference Report and the 
various other Congressmen quoted in Metropolitan Life and in Taylor 
were thinking squarely about the effect of the Insurance Savings 
Clause on welfare plans, it should not matter.  Congress votes on 
legislation as written, not on the wording of debates or of 
explanatory reports.310  “It is the function of the courts, and not the 
Legislature . . . to say what an enacted statute means.”311 
In other situations, the Court has found language similar to 
that of the insurance savings clause to be sufficiently clear as to 
foreclose consideration of the legislative record.  In Norfolk & 
Western Railway Co.  v. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen,312 the statute 
provided that a railroad carrier “is exempt from the antitrust laws 
and from all other law, including State and municipal law, as 
necessary [to let the carrier carry out certain defined functions].”313  
The Court noted that the language was “clear, broad, and 
unqualified” and refused to consider whether the Congressional 
record might suggest that Congress intended the exemption 
 
 307. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 24 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1998). 
 308. The Court has itself observed that statements made during the legislative 
process, “unless very precisely directed to the intended meaning of particular 
words in a statute, can seldom be expected to be as precise as the enacted 
language itself.”  Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 237 (1984). 
 309. 471 U.S. 724, 745 (1985). 
 310. Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 616 (1991). 
 311. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 582 
(1994). 
 312. 499 U.S. 117 (1991). 
 313. Id. at 119 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 11341(a)). 
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applied only to certain classes of laws and not others.314 
Similarly, in United States v. Gonzales,315 the Court considered a 
section of the criminal code that says that if a person is sentenced 
to prison for drug trafficking while using or carrying a firearm the 
“term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection 
[shall not] run concurrently with any other term of 
imprisonment.”316  The Court found the phrase “any other term of 
imprisonment” to be unambiguous and not reasonably susceptible 
to meaning only federal prison sentences.317  It therefore found no 
reason to resort to legislative history, even if that history might 
suggest otherwise.318 
The insurance savings clause is equally comprehensive and 
unsusceptible to inferred exceptions.  Pilot Life and Taylor should 
not have considered legislative history which undid the 
unambiguous statutory language.  Moreover, if the standard 
needed to justify complete preemption was a finding of “clear” 
legislative intent, Pilot Life and Taylor were even more egregious.  
Unfortunately, the Davila/Calad Court missed the opportunity to 
acknowledge the slender foundations that underlay complete 
preemption and disavow the language or, if necessary, the holdings 
of those cases.319 
IV. THE LOWER COURTS’ RATIONALES — EFFORTS BY THE RISING 
JUDICIAL CHORUS TO FIND AN EXCEPTION FOR MIXED ELIGIBILITY 
AND TREATMENT DECISIONS 
As observed at Part II.C, three circuits of the United States 
Court of Appeals (the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh) and one state 
supreme court (Pennsylvania) attempted to find tort liability for 
 
 314. Id. at 128. 
 315. 520 U.S. 1 (1997). 
 316. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2000). 
 317. Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 5. 
 318. Id. at 6. 
 319. Davila/Calad also cited Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 
355 (2002) for the proposition that Congress intended to create an exclusive 
remedy in ERISA § 502(a).  Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2500.  Rush Prudential, 
however, held that a state law requiring external review of medical necessity 
decisions did not create a remedy of the sort prohibited under Pilot Life and Taylor.  
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 536 U.S. at 373-74 (2002). In dictum, it said that if it 
had to address such a law, Pilot Life and Taylor would require that it be preempted.  
Id. at 375-79.  Even in dictum, Rush Prudential did not add to the force of the 
arguments that underlay Pilot Life and Taylor; it merely repeated them.  Id. 
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“mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.”320  The reason for such 
approach is not hard to surmise.  The lower courts were dissatisfied 
with a jurisprudence that left such a large gap in the regulatory 
structure of employer sponsored health insurance plans.  No 
matter how dissatisfied the lower courts may have been with that 
jurisprudence, however, it was outside their purview to rewrite the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation on a matter of federal law.  
Therefore, they looked for an alternative way to reach the desired 
result. 
That alternative seemed to be the Court’s pronouncement in 
Pegram v. Herdrich321 that HMO coverage decisions involving issues 
of mixed eligibility and treatment fell outside ERISA’s fiduciary 
liability requirements.322  Such decisions, under this reading, would 
not be deemed to “relate to” the employee benefit plan itself and, if 
the Court concurred, would never impinge upon either the general 
preemption requirement of section 514(a)323 or the complete 
preemption doctrine of Pilot Life and Taylor. The Fifth Circuit did 
not attempt to invoke the insurance savings clause argument, 
because to do so would have violated its obligation to adhere to 
binding Supreme Court rulings.324  The other circuits and the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania could not even have considered 
the insurance savings clause, as they did not have before them a 
state law that might have come within its scope.  Even those judges 
who felt unable to stretch the Pegram dictum sufficiently far as to 
allow recovery of tort damages acknowledged the need to change 
the law.325  Ultimately, the Supreme Court denied the attempt to fit 
Davila/Calad within this concept, as it would have required an 
essentially new reading of ERISA, not mandated by the statutory 
language itself.326  Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, however, joined 
“the rising judicial chorus” of dissatisfaction with the result.327 
 
 320. See infra Part II.C. 
 321. 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
 322. Id. at 229-30. 
 323. Id. at 231. 
 324. See generally Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(consolidated with Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila and CIGNA HealthCare of Tex., 
Inc. v. Calad). 
 325. E.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453-61 (3d Cir. 
2003) (Becker, J., concurring); Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(Calabresi, J., dissenting in part). 
 326. 124 S. Ct. at 2500-02. 
 327. Id. at 2503. 
50
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/3
3NELSON 3/18/2005  4:07:20 PM 
2005] A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 893 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s doctrine of complete ERISA preemption 
is unsatisfactory, but not because the damages of those who have 
been injured by HMOs’ medical necessity decisions must 
sometimes go uncompensated.  Complete ERISA preemption is 
unsatisfactory because it usurps constitutionally allocated powers of 
co-equal branches of government.  It limits state judiciaries’ 
authority to determine whether ERISA preempts their own state’s 
laws.  It encroaches on Congress’s prerogative to determine the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.  Most importantly, it deprives 
state legislatures of their right to enact legislation to rectify the 
economic imbalance between HMOs and their members. 
Whether HMOs should bear tort liability for negligent medical 
necessity decisions is a subject for debate, well suited for resolution 
by varying state laws.  ERISA, through its specific language and by 
its overall structure, anticipates such resolution.  To return to 
Justice Brandeis — 
There must be power in the states and the nation to 
remould [sic], through experimentation, our economic 
practices and institutions to met changing social and 
economic needs . . .. To stay experimentation in things 
social and economic is a grave responsibility.  Denial of 
the right to experiment may be fraught with serious 
consequences to the nation.328 
The Supreme Court, largely by reasons of historical accident, 
has failed to give a fair reading to the wording or to the objects and 
purposes of ERISA.  The issue of tort liability against HMOs has 
been taken from its proper forum, the state legislatures, and any 
reform must come through Congress—decidedly the wrong forum. 
 
 328. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
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(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action 
may be brought— 
(1) by a participant or beneficiary—(A) for the relief provided 
for in subsection (c) of this section, or (B) to recover benefits due 
to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the 
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under 
the terms of the plan; 
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or 
fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 409 [29 U.S.C.S. § 
1109]; 
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any 
act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms 
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) 
to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this 
title or the terms of the plan; 
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for 
appropriate relief in the case of a violation of 105I [29 U.S.C.S. § 
1025I]; 
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), by the 
Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any 
provision of this title, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable 
relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of 
this title; 
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under 
paragraph (2), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of subsection I or under 
subsection (i) or (l); 
(7) by a State to enforce compliance with a qualified medical 
child support order (as defined in section 609(a)(2)(A) [29 
U.S.C.S. § 1169(a)(2)(A)]); 
(8) by the Secretary, or by an employer or other person 
referred to in section 101(f)(1) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1021(f)(1)], (A) to 
enjoin any act or practice which violates subsection (f) of section 
101 [29 U.S.C.S. § 1021(f)], or (B) to obtain appropriate equitable 
relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce such 
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subsection; or 
(9) in the event that the purchase of an insurance contract or 
insurance annuity in connection with termination of an 
individual’s status as a participant covered under a pension plan 
with respect to all or any portion of the participant’s pension 
benefit under such plan constitutes a violation of part 4 of this title 
[subtitle] or the terms of the plan, by the Secretary, by any 
individual who was a participant or beneficiary at the time of the 
alleged violation, or by a fiduciary, to obtain appropriate relief, 
including the posting of security if necessary, to assure receipt by 
the participant or beneficiary of the amounts provided or to be 
provided by such insurance contract or annuity, plus reasonable 
prejudgment interest on such amounts. 
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EXHIBIT B 
 
Excerpts from ERISA §514(a) and (b) 
 
Effect on Other Laws 
 
(a) Supersedure. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section, the provisions of this title and title IV shall supersede any 
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) [29 U.S.C.S. § 
1003(a)] and not exempt under section 4(b) [29 U.S.C.S. § 
1003(b)]. 
(b) Construction and application. 
(2) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in 
this title shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from 
any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or 
securities. 
  (B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 
4(a) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(a)], which is not exempt under section 
4(b) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)] (other than a plan established 
primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any 
trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an 
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or 
investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance 
or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to 
regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust 
companies, or investment companies.  
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